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ABSTRACT
While some Foucault-inspired studies construe local ownership in international
interventions as a form of liberal governmentality that aims to govern through
freedom, others lambast it as an illiberal governmentality that is likely to be
resisted because it undermines local autonomy. However, we still do not
know what is the rationality behind local ownership, how it is being
operationalized, and why a principle that aims to govern through freedom
ends up curtailing it. I argue that local ownership, echoing the colonial
principle of indirect rule, is driven by the rationality of advanced democracies
on how best to govern global insecurities at a distance. Consequently,
ownership is operationalized as responsibilization for externally designed
objectives. This often gives rise to local resistance which undermines
international efforts to achieve ownership. I illustrate my arguments with
evidence from the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the
Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor).
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Among countless International Relations (IR) neologisms that have mush-
roomed in the post-cold war period, local ownership has a pride of place.
While the precise meaning of local ownership is contested, it is always
based on a premise that international support to peace is only viable if it
relies on a certain degree of local capacity and participation. Since the turn
of the century, local ownership has become “the gold standard of successful
peace and statebuilding” (Dursun-Özkanca & Crossley-Frolick, 2012,
p. 251). The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of this trend
by endorsing ownership across its external policies and even claiming it to
be a principle “inherent in the European approach to international relations”
(EU, 2008, p. 3).
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Despite this strong rhetorical shift, “insufficient local ownership” remains
one of the key challenges of international interventions (Paris, 2010, p. 347).
Although measuring a degree of ownership remains a methodological chal-
lenge, the prevailing consensus among scholars is that ownership is one of
the weakest links of contemporary peacebuilding and statebuilding interven-
tions (Donais, 2012, p. 1). The United Nations (UN), which pioneered the
concept, for example, has failed to match its rhetoric on ownership with its
peacebuilding practice (Von Billerbeck, 2016, p. 4). The EU has also struggled
to live up to this principle in its crisis management interventions launched as
part of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Dursun-Özkanca,
2017; Ejdus, 2017; Freire & Simão, 2013; Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012; Grevi,
Helly, & Keohane, 2009; Merlingen, 2011a, 2011b; Rayroux & Wilén, 2014;
Tolksdorf, 2014; Vandemoortele, 2012).
As it has been discussed in the introduction to this special issue (Ejdus &
Juncos, 2018), the local ownership principle has been one of the central
themes of the “local turn” in peacebuilding (Donais, 2012; Mac Ginty,
2015). While it is beyond the scope of this article to do justice to this
sizable literature, my goal here is to particularly draw on scholarly debates
that analyze local ownership through the lenses of Michel Foucault’s (2007,
2008) concept of governmentality. This concept denotes a set of rationalities
and techniques for the exercise of power in liberal societies. Although some
Foucault-inspired studies in IR have accepted whole cloth the ownership prin-
ciple as a liberal form of global governance (Best, 2007; Kurki, 2011; Neumann
& Sending, 2010), others have criticized it as an illiberal governmentality that
serves as a rhetorical cover for imposition (Chandler, 2010; Richmond, 2012).
Existing studies, however, neither delve into the governmental rationality
behind the local ownership principle, how it is operationalized on the
ground, nor do they provide an account why it ends up curtailing autonomy
of those who are on the receiving end of interventions.
The central argument of this article is that the contemporary principle of
local ownership, echoing the colonial principle of indirect rule, is driven by
the political rationality of advanced democracies which launch, finance, and
design interventions and not by the political rationality of host states and
societies. Disillusioned with the early post-cold war enthusiasm to rapidly
export liberal governance abroad, the global North endorsed the local own-
ership principle as a pragmatic and more sustainable approach to peace-
building and statebuilding. Consequently, as I demonstrate, ownership is
habitually operationalized as a supply-driven responsibilization of host
states for externally designed objectives. Finally, in conflict-affected settings,
where both state institutions and democracy are weak or non-existent, this
alien governmentality often gives rise to various forms of local contestation
and resistance that ultimately undermine international efforts to achieve the
local buy-in.
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My empirical illustrations draw on 30 interviews conducted in Brussels
(June 2016) and in Somalia/Somaliland (November 2016) with different sta-
keholders involved in EUCAP Nestor.1 The mission was launched in 2012
with an initial mandate of two years to “assist the development in the Horn
of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity
for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-
piracy, and maritime governance” (EU, 2012, p. 40). Initially, the mission
covered five states: Djibouti, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tanzania.
Since March 2015, the mission phased out of the region and focused on
Somalia where the problem of piracy originated. In December 2016, the
Council of the EU renamed the mission into the Capacity Building Mission
in Somalia (EUCAP Somalia) and extended its mandate until December
2018 (EU, 2016, p. 18).
The mission was chosen as the empirical illustration because it is an excel-
lent example of an international governmental effort. Faced with the problem
of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the EU launched the mission with the aim of
responsibilizing and enabling target states to solve the problem of piracy on
their own by subjecting them to a systematic inspection, reform, and monitor-
ing (Merlingen, 2003, 2011a, 2011b). To be sure, the degree of ownership cer-
tainly varies from one intervention to another, and the challenges of
implementation in EUCAP Nestor are not entirely generalizable. However,
I posit that EUCAP Nestor illustrates well the governmental rationality
behind the local ownership principle more generally, technology, and tech-
niques through which it is operationalized as well as different modes of
local resistance to this alien governmentality.
The article proceeds in the following order. In the first section, I briefly
discuss how local ownership has been conceptualized within governmentality
studies in IR and what contribution I intend to make to this body of knowl-
edge. In the second section, I discuss the political rationality of local owner-
ship. The third section outlines techniques used to operationalize local
ownership, while the fourth section analyses various forms of resistance
that all this gives rise to. In conclusion, I discuss implications of the arguments
advanced in the article and suggest some ideas for further research.
Governmentality studies and local ownership
Governmentality, a term first coined by Foucault (2007, p. 108), in the broad-
est possible sense denotes any historic form of rationality of rule. In the
narrower sense, governmentality means an ensemble of liberal discourses
and practices that have populations as their target and which started to
develop in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards. For Foucault, this
process implies a shift from the rationality of a sovereign to the rationality
of the governed population. This is, what for Foucault (2008) “characterizes
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liberal rationality: how to model government, the art of government, how to
[found] the principle of rationalization of the art of government on the
rational behavior of those who are governed” (p. 312). He then goes on to
explain how this new political rationality of governing less–but better, gradu-
ally rolled back the state and led to the contemporary post-war neoliberalism.
Foucault’s ideas on governmentality inspired a wider field of governmen-
tality studies (Osborne, Rose, & Barry, 1996). While Foucault’s work started to
shape discussions within IR already in the 1980s, in recent years his concept of
governmentality has been extensively used to critically interrogate the spread
of liberal norms, practices, and institutions in world politics (Kiersey &
Stokes, 2013; Larner & Walters, 2004; Merlingen, 2006; Neumann &
Sending, 2007). Many IR scholars have characterized local ownership as
another form of liberal governmentality in world politics (Best, 2007, p. 96;
Kurki, 2011, p. 353; Neumann & Sending, 2010, p. 144). Kurki (2011), for
example, writes that “the key aspect of neoliberal governance… is the empha-
sis on the local ownership of the processes of decision making” (p. 353).
Others, also drawing on the work of Foucault and his concept of govern-
mentality, have critiqued ownership as an essentially illiberal practice. Rich-
mond (2012), for example, argues that ownership is “illiberal, distant
governmentality which is likely to be resisted because it undermines political
autonomy, legitimacy and identity” (p. 371). He writes that this resistance
nevertheless holds a “potential for a postcolonial form of peace…” (Chandler
& Richmond, 2015, p. 6). Chandler is less optimistic and argues that owner-
ship is an unsalvageable governmental technology of post liberalism, to which
the West regressed after the failure of early post-cold war experiment to
export its modes of political and economic governance (Chandler, 2010;
Chandler & Richmond, 2015).
Such a stark contrast in the interpretation of local ownership stems less
from a different understanding of liberalism and more from looking at differ-
ent aspects of this principle. While the former foreground liberal discourses
around the local ownership principle, the latter zoom on the gap between
the high liberal rhetoric of ownership and pathologies that occur during its
practical operationalization. None of them, however, investigate the political
rationality behind this principle. Moreover, the extant governmentality
studies of local ownership in IR have missed to provide an account of how
and why local ownership turns from an attempt to govern across borders
through freedom into a “liberogenic practice” that ends up being resisted
for curtailing autonomy of those who are supposed to be liberated (cf. Fou-
cault, 2008, p. 69).
To understand this, it is first important to analytically distinguish dis-
courses from material practices. To be sure, the majority of works on govern-
mentality follow a post-structuralist ontology that is only concerned with
discourses. However, such a radically anti-realist meta-theoretical standpoint,
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 31
mostly drawing on Foucault’s later work, is not the only possible take on gov-
ernmentality. As it has already been argued before, the concept of governmen-
tality can also be pegged to a “realist ontology” which Foucault himself
implicitly espoused in his earlier works (Frauley, 2007). In this paper, I will
draw upon this “realist governmentality,” which keeps epistemological relati-
vism but goes beyond the focus on text to also include governing practices and
their structural and material conditions of existence (Joseph, 2010; McKee,
2009; Stenson, 2005).
Moreover, it is important to make a distinction between domestic and
international governmentality. Domestic governmentality, which was
studied by Foucault, evolved gradually in the west over the centuries and oper-
ates as a power beyond the state. International governmentality, on the other
hand, is driven by the political rationality of liberal states and used by them to
shape institutions, behavior or policies of democratizing, developing and con-
flict-affected states. The origins of contemporary international governmental-
ity are in the colonial governmentality (Scott, 1995). The toolbox used by the
imperial powers to govern their colonies certainly possessed liberal elements,
but the rationality behind was considerably different from the one which
transformed Europe from within (Mbembé, 2001; Shani, 2006, pp. 27–28).
International governmentality in the post-colonial era relies even more
strongly on subtle methods of governance that aim to regulate social
conduct at a distance. Nevertheless, it is less about the regulation of popu-
lations and more of an instrument used by powerful states and their inter-
national institutions to govern weak ones (Joseph, 2009). But those on the
receiving end of interventions do not only have weaker democratic insti-
tutions (or none at all), they often lack a state in the Western sense of the
term. Due to this unevenness of the international, and often starkly different
socio-political conditions in target states, the attempts to use governmentality
across borders often fail to achieve their objectives (Joseph, 2010, 2012).
In the rest of this article, I draw on these insights and take them further
both theoretically and empirically. To that end, I first genealogically trace
the governmental rationality of local ownership back to the late colonial prin-
ciple of indirect rule. Then I discuss the political technology of ownership,
which refers to the way in which this principle is operationalized in practice.
Finally, I examine different forms of local resistance to ownership.
Political rationality of local ownership
Political rationality is “the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same
time, reflection on the best possible way of governing” (Foucault, 2008,
p. 2). Its aim is not only to legitimize, but also to render reality governable.
One of Foucault’s central preoccupations was the emergence of a liberal
rationality of government in Europe. While sovereignty and discipline are
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forms of direct power that rest on the rationality of the ruler, liberalism is a
form of power that is exercised indirectly (Foucault, 2007, pp. 108–109).
Most importantly, it is not based on the rationality of the state, or raison
d’état, but on the rationality of the governed population. In this section, I
argue that local ownership is driven by the rationality of advanced democra-
cies concerned on how best to govern global insecurities at a distance and I
trace its origins to the late colonial indirect rule.
The local ownership principle is indeed coated in liberal idioms such as
self-determination, sovereignty, participation, partnership, and cooperation
(Chesterman, 2007, p. 20; Shinoda, 2015, p. 20; Von Billerbeck, 2015,
p. 299). The EU, for instance, defines ownership in CSDP interventions as
“the appropriation by the local authorities of the commonly agreed objectives
and principles” (EU, 2005, p. 11). Metaphors that are used to depict owner-
ship also have a strong liberal string attached. For example, peacebuilders
often argue that “the locals should be in the driving seat” which implies
liberal values of autonomy and self-rule (Suhrke, 2007, p. 1305). In addition
to this, the language of “ownership,” “buy-ins,” and “demand-driven reforms”
clearly reflects liberal economic discourse.
Still, the political rationality of the local ownership principle in inter-
national interventions is markedly different from that of domestic liberalism
studied by Foucault. In contrast to liberalism at home, which emerged orga-
nically based on the political rationality of governed populations, local own-
ership in international interventions is based on the political rationality of
interveners. Its origins, therefore, are not to be sought (or not only), as
Shinoda (2015) suggests, “in the French Revolution and its ideal of national
self-determination” (p. 20). The association of local ownership with sover-
eignty and self-determination is part of a settled policy narrative that natur-
alizes this principle as inherent to the liberal international order. My goal
here is to disrupt this official script and genealogically trace the origins of
the local ownership principle back to the colonial rule.
While the term itself is an early post-cold war invention, the logic of local
ownership can be situated in a wider grid of political rationality of colonial-
ism. Wilén (2009, p. 340), for instance, notes that the term ownership first
appeared within the colonial administration discourse in the 1940s. I argue
that the logic of ownership is reminiscent of the colonial principle of indirect
rule which harks back further into the past. In some way, every imperial enter-
prise, especially when the control is weak and outposts are far from the metro-
poles, relies on some form of indirect rule through “allegiances with local
powers” (Barkawi, 2011, p. 601). But from the mid-nineteenth century
onwards, the colonial rule shifted from what was predominantly direct to
an indirect rule. The process was kick started with the Indian Mutiny in
1857, which revealed the limits of an ambition to Westernize India, the
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consequence of which the colonial rule shifted “from rejuvenating to conser-
ving society” (Mamdani, 1996, p. 49).
The indirect rule, as a model of governance perfected by the British in
India, was later applied in the Equatorial Africa. Lord Frederick Lugard,
one of the architects of British colonial rule in Africa, captures well the
logic and the know-how of an indirect rule. For him, “the first step” of
every indirect rule
is to endeavor to find a man of influence as chief, and to group under him as
many villages or districts as possible, to teach him to delegate powers, and to
take an interest in his “Native Treasury” to support his authority, and to incul-
cate a sense of responsibility. (Mamdani, 1996, p. 53)
The logic of indirect rule over the volatile post-imperial penumbra survived
the end of colonialism. The old imperial system of indirect rule was super-
seded by a system in which former imperial subjects became governed
through their own states. Indirect rule continued to operate, through inter-
national programs that “assist, advise, and constrain the conduct of postcolo-
nial states” (Chatterjee, 2017, p. 88; Hindess, 2005, p. 409). This post-colonial
evolution of indirect rule had a strong security aspect as well. Throughout the
cold war, superpowers competed indirectly through local proxies to avoid the
risks of a direct clash. Their missions of advice and support in the field of
defense and security echoed the early periods of European colonialism
when the metropoles controlled their colonial possessions indirectly
through military assistance, persuasion and bargaining with native allies
(Barkawi, 2011, p. 603).
The end of the cold war bloated ambitions of developed democracies that
they can and have a duty to engineer liberal transformation of the world,
echoing the colonial era idea of “mission civilisatrice” (Paris, 2002). Contem-
porary principle of ownership started to first emerge within the field of devel-
opment in the 1990s as criticisms against structural adjustment programs of
the IMF and the World Bank intensified (OECD, 1995; Richmond, 2012,
p. 356). By the end of the 1990s, however, evidence was mounting that the
Western model of governance is often not gaining local traction in weak
states (Paris, 2004). This created a “crisis of confidence” in the liberal peace
paradigm and made clear that without accommodating local customs,
values, and leaders, international interventions could not achieve effective
and sustainable results on the ground (Hameiri, Hughes, & Scarpello, 2017;
p. 1; Lee & Özerdem, 2015, p. 1). The first steps in translating ownership
into a principle of peacebuilding and statebuilding were made by international
interveners in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999 (Merdžanović, 2015, p. 228).
Before long, ownership was endorsed by key actors involved in international
interventions (Donais, 2012; Von Billerbeck, 2016) and by fragile and conflict-
affected states (Nussbaum, Zorbas, & Koros, 2012).
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Ownership also became one of the key principles underpinning all external
policies of the EU including development, enlargement, neighborhood, con-
flict prevention, and crisis management (Ejdus, 2017, p. 5). Akin to other
peacebuilders, the EU has justified the principle on pragmatic grounds, as
an indispensable path to sustainability of reforms (EU, 2015a, p. 8; Interviews
12, 17, 80, and 88). In the words of one crisis management strategist from the
European External Action Service (EEAS):
For me, it’s not a principle that is important in and of itself, because it stems
from sovereignty. I don’t care about it. It’s important because of its practical
effects and because there is no sustainability without local ownership. (Inter-
view 12)
In addition to this, the EU uses ownership to make its interventions more
legitimate and immunize itself against the charges of neocolonialism (Ches-
terman, 2007, p. 9; Rayroux & Wilén, 2014, p. 26; Wilén, 2009, pp. 340–
341). While scholars increasingly debate the echoes of empire in EU’s external
policies (Nicolaïdis, Sèbe, & Maas, 2014) or even study the EU as a modern
empire (Behr & Stivachtis, 2015; Zielonka, 2007), the EU is denying any con-
tinuities with the colonial past (Onar & Nicolaïdis, 2013). As one EU crisis
management planner put it: “Behind the local ownership principle there is
a fear that the EU is going to be seen as a colonialist power. It gives the EU
the shape of support rather than imposing” (Interview 11).
The governmental rationality of local ownership can be illustrated well in
the case of EUCAP Nestor. To begin with, the mission was not launched in
response to local needs but to protect the interests of the EU. After pirate
attacks on the commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden peaked in 2008, thus
incurring great costs for the European shipping industries and insurance
companies, the EU was under strong pressure to do something (Interviews
33, 36, and 109). In December 2008, the EU deployed a naval counter-
piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR Atalanta). However,
it soon became increasingly clear that the root causes of piracy lied onshore
so the EU launched EUCAP Nestor in July 2012 as an exit strategy of
EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Interviews 36 and 81). These two missions were not
deployed, as one EU diplomat put it, “because it makes us feel good or
because it saves lives. We are doing it because it became too expensive to
send ships through the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden and that’s it”
(Interview 109).
If the rationale of launching EUCAP Nestor was to protect EU’s commer-
cial and political interests in the Horn of Africa, the rationale of achieving
ownership in this mission has been to turn host states into capable vehicles
of reaching these strategic objectives. In other words, the effort of EUCAP
Nestor to foster local ownership has not been driven by EU’s attachment to
sovereignty or self-determination of host nations. Instead, the EU has used
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the language of sovereignty and self-determination to inculcate a sense of
responsibility in local actors for counter-piracy tasks, and hence create a sus-
tainable proxy solution to the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Inter-
views 80 and 96).
The problem with this approach was that it totally neglected the political
rationalities of those who are on the receiving end of the intervention. Most
importantly, none of the host states, except probably the Seychelles, saw
piracy as their problem. Instead, they prioritized other maritime challenges
such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, arms smuggling, human
trafficking, and waste dumping (Interviews 74, 76, 77, and 98). In Somalia,
most people perceive piracy as a legitimate reaction to illegal foreign fishing
and international interventions as part of the same plot (Kerins, 2016). One
Somali associate of EUCAP Nestor complains that the EU has been reluctant
to offer the knowledge and capacities to Somalis to effectively patrol their
waters:
It’s a terribly dishonest system and one of the ways that system can work is that
you have to keep Somalis away from protecting their waters… This shows total
reluctance to transfer to Somalis any form of substantial local ownership of
maritime security even within their own territorial waters. (Interview 98)
Over time, however, the mission gradually adjusted to local realities. The
mission de-scaled from the region which is not only enormous (half the size
of the EU) but also mired in protracted conflict. It started focusing on
Somalia only, where the problem of piracy originated, moved its headquarters
from Djibouti to Mogadishu International Airport, and opened field offices in
Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Garowe (Puntland). Moreover, its mandate broad-
ened to include not only piracy, but also other maritime challenges, including
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and human or arms trafficking
(EU, 2016). Nevertheless, the fundamental rationale of the intervention,
which is to build local capacities for the fight against piracy, remains unchanged.
To sum up, in this section I have traced the origins of the local ownership
principle back to the late colonial principle of indirect rule and analyzed its
post-colonial evolution borne out of changing concerns of the West on how
best to govern the rest. However, by no means have I suggested that the own-
ership principle is a neo-colonial continuation of an indirect rule aimed to
extract resources of the former imperial domains. Today’s peacebuilding
and statebuilding interventions, although clearly driven by the concerns of
strong northern states about insecurities in the global South, are nevertheless
framed in the language of freedom and self-determination, both absent in
the colonial times. In the next section, I turn to the analysis of how this com-
bination of the (post)colonial mindset and liberal language shapes practical
operationalization of ownership.
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Political technology of local ownership
Political technology is a material aspect of governmentality and “refers to the
practices and devices through which political rationalities are operationalized
and implemented in actual governance programmes and activities” (Merlin-
gen, 2011a, p. 153). In this section, I show that ownership is not only a rheto-
ric that serves to legitimize interventions or shield interveners from charges of
neocolonialism but a discourse that shapes intervention practices, although in
a way that often constrains local agency.
The central technology of ownership in international interventions is
responsibilization. The concept of responsibilization was not explicitly
coined by Foucault but emerged within the larger field of governmentality
studies (Biebricher, 2011; Löwenheim, 2007; Shamir, 2008). Biebricher
(2011) defines it as a “technique that turns individuals into subjects that con-
sider themselves as free and responsible for their own actions as well as the
respective outcomes” (p. 471). Under neoliberalism, individuals are asked
to take rational decisions as citizens and consumers but they are also called
to bear the consequences for their own actions. Despite occasional resistance,
domestic responsibilization in liberal societies “works,” as it effectively pro-
duces “free and responsible” subjects thus allowing the neoliberal logic to
roll back the state.
In world politics, responsibilization also implies a process of producing
states that can take care of themselves (Löwenheim, 2008). Responsibilization
across borders, however, is not entirely analogous to domestic responsibiliza-
tion within liberal societies. Domestic responsibilization implies an organic
process that redefines relationships between citizens and their democratic
states. International responsibilization is different in that it involves an
attempt to impose a political rationality developed within one polity to
shape behavior of another. Domestic responsibilization is directed toward
populations so that the state can step back and society can self-regulate. In
international responsibilization, states do not step back but rather remain
to be in front and center of the process in which interveners try to responsi-
bilize host states (through those who represent it or act on their behalf) for the
implementation of objectives that are not of their own making.
In CSDP missions, the EU also operationalizes ownership as a responsibi-
lization of host authorities so that they can implement externally designed
objectives. It is used, as Merlingen (2011b) points out, “to socialise locals
into their way of thinking and to persuade them to accept the proposed
reforms as in their own best interest and thus to implement them effectively”
(p. 205). The ownership principle allows the EU to keep the power of deciding
about the objectives of interventions without having to bear the responsibility
for their outcomes (Interview 43). The EU and its member states decide when,
how, and to what end they will intervene. Locals, on the other hand, are
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expected to internalize objectives of interventions. As one EUCAP Nestor
member puts it, ownership “is a test to see whether the locals are ready to
assume responsibility for this and if we are on the right track” (Interview 80).
Responsibilization in CSDP missions is implemented through a variety of
techniques such as training, advising, mentoring, monitoring, capacity build-
ing, evaluation, benchmarking, peer-review, embedding, co-location, twin-
ning, needs assessment, gap analysis, engaging local leaders, joint planning,
and many others. In his analysis of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, for
example, Merlingen (2011a) shows how mentors mobilize the authority of
their allegedly superior western knowledge to inculcate a sense of responsibil-
ity among the local professionals to narrow the gap (cf. İşleyen, 2017). Due to
space constraints, I will here only discuss two exemplary techniques of local
ownership to illustrate how responsibilization shapes everyday practices in
EUCAP Nestor.
One responsibilization techniques in international interventions is enga-
ging local leaders. According to OECD’s instructions on how to start the own-
ership process, which is strikingly similar to the previously quoted Lugar’s
advice on the first steps of any indirect colonial rule,
The first step is to lay out a specific plan, with clear time lines and success indi-
cators, that identifies the various local actors who will be involved in pro-
gramme design and implementation, their roles and responsibilities, how
they will be engaged, and what will be achieved through their engagement.
(OECD, 2007, p. 64)
In CSDP missions, local leaders are engaged and responsibilized in differ-
ent ways. One of the EU’s recommendations on local ownership based on
the lessons learned exercise, for instance, was that “the EEAS should
invite key political leaders of host countries to Brussels for face-to-face
encounters with the [ambassadorial Political and Security Committee,
PSC] to raise the profile of CSDP missions and to underline the importance
of political accountability” (EU, 2015a, p. 9). To fulfill this recommendation,
as one EU official explains, “the president of the Central African Republic
came to Brussels, talked to the PSC, there were a number of high profile con-
tacts, and we raised the profile of the mission, so we ticked the box there”
(Interview 15). Member states’ delegates in the PSC sometimes visit host
states and meet with local leaders. Counterparts that they meet, as one
PSC delegate recalls, “tell you what you want to hear… that the mission
should still be there because for them it’s a political signal that they can
show that are willing to change, so the mission should be prolonged…”
(Interview 36). Finally, to ensure the local buy-in, CSDP missions’ staff
engages local leaders on a more regular basis through what is often referred
to as “focal points,” “entry points,” and “key leader engagement” (KLE) on
the ground.
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In EUCAP Nestor, for example, the EU conducts KLE. The EU officials
speak of the technique with the usual liberal language of consensus and
mutually agreed objectives. As one EUCAP Nestor advisor explains, “the
aim of KLEs is to have a common understanding and to share information
about mutual projects, activities, and plans, but also to show our presence
and commitment…” (Interview 88). However, the technique was borrowed
from counter-insurgency doctrines where it denotes “an area where comman-
ders have an opportunity to change the behavior of those with the greatest
influence over the population” (United Kingdom, 2009, pp. 6–7). It is there-
fore not designed in the first place to align the intervention to the needs of the
locals, but primarily to align the local elites with the objectives of the interven-
tion. This is how KLE is also perceived by the locals. They see KLEs as an
attempt of the EU to impress the locals and secure their buy-in but also as
a useful opportunity to communicate their needs and raise their personal
or institutional profiles (Interviews 76, 84, and 91).
Another usual technique used to responsibilize the locals is joint plan-
ning. While in some cases the EU might operate only based on a resolution
of the UN Security Council, EU decisions, and a formal invitation by host
countries, most of the missions also conclude agreements regulating diplo-
matic status of missions (SOMA) and forces (SOFA). However, in some mis-
sions, to increase local ownership, the EU signs with host governments joint
action plans (JAPs) and compact agreements. To oversee the implemen-
tation of these documents, the EU and host states then often establish
joint monitoring and evaluation bodies. The policy rhetoric construes
these instruments as tools for negotiating mutually agreed objectives and
activities. In practice, however, the main objective of joint planning is
often to inculcate in the locals a sense of ownership and responsibility for
the implementation of objectives that are not of their own making.
Joint planning in EUCAP Nestor is an illustrative case in point. The
mission agreed with the Government of Somaliland that the “overarching
priority” was “to develop a common and agreed starting point for the
desired Somaliland Coast Guard ‘Capability Target’” (Cooperation Agree-
ment, 2014, p. 3). In the JAP, the two sides further “agreed” that the
target achievement was the “Limited Initial Operational Capability”
(LIOC) by the end of 2016 (EU, 2015c, p. 1). The JAP states that the
process of achieving the LIOC was “demand driven” and that it follows a
“bottom-up” approach which means that its objectives are “aligned with
Somaliland’s Vision” and “National Development plans…” (EU, 2014,
p. 1). Based on this early “success,” the EUCAP Nestor Strategic Review
from March 2015 even portrayed the JAP “as a model for the Missions
future support to other Somali services involved in coastal and maritime
law enforcement” (EU, 2015b, p. 12).
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Despite this policy rhetoric, the EU was firmly in control of the entire
process. The EU presented both the draft and the methodology to the
locals and they were more than happy with that. As one EUCAP Nestor offi-
cial recalls: “They were themselves not able to make additions, not only
because of limitations in their command of English language but also due
to their inability to master the intricacies of maritime security” (Interview
96). A representative of the Somaliland foreign ministry confirmed this: “In
the process of drafting the JAP, EUCAP Nestor was in the driving seat. It
was based on how they wanted to assist us. It was basically a plan of their
activities” (Interview 95).
To increase the degree of local ownership over the JAP and its objectives,
the mission started training and mentoring a group of young coast guard offi-
cers. Once the EU considered them ready, they were expected to take the
responsibility to carry the coast guard capacity building forward (Interviews
96, 97, and 99). In addition to training, this group of young Somalilanders
was given laptops and radios, with a view, as one former EUCAP Nestor
staff member put it “to buy their loyalty and shape their ideas and mentality”
(Interview 99).
In sum, as this section has shown, the principle of ownership is more than a
mere rhetoric that only serves to legitimize interventions but a technology of
international security governance that shapes intervention practices.
However, as these practices are based on the rationality of interveners,
instead of locals, they engender several forms of resistance to which the
article turns next.
Local resistance to ownership
The above-discussed governmental technology aims to shape the conduct of
host states and societies by inculcating a sense of responsibility for externally
designed objectives and ideas. In some cases, locals comply with international
expectations or even invite imposition (Krogstad, 2014). Quite often,
however, locals resist assuming ownership either by adapting liberal peace
interventions and grafting them on the pre-existing structures or practices
or openly contesting them. What results from this international/local inter-
action is inevitably some form of hybridity (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond,
2012; Wallis, 2012). The goal of this section is to empirically illustrate how
previously described responsibilization techniques, because they are based
on the rationality of interveners (instead of locals), often end up being per-
ceived as imposed and as such resisted.
Resistance, or a “struggle against the processes implemented for conduct-
ing others” (Foucault, 2007, p. 201), can be either direct or indirect. While
direct resistance is an open, and overt contestation that is followed by an
equivalent public narrative, indirect resistance encompasses covert behavior
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aimed at undermining international governmental efforts and which is
usually underpinned by hidden transcripts (Scott, 1990). Direct resistance
to ongoing international interventions by the official authorities is rather
rare. Indirect resistance, on the other hand, is endemic, although it is also
more difficult to detect it (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 403). This infrapolitics, as
Scott (1990, pp. 183–191) calls it, is not a substitute for open resistance but
rather its condition, because the hidden transcript of resistance prepares the
ground for the public, and more direct contestation.
Today virtually all international interventions take place only when there is
a formal consent of host states. This means that before interventions can
begin, host governments issue a formal invitation expressing their willingness
to host an intervention on their territory. This is then followed by the signa-
ture of status of forces/mission agreements as well as other joint documents
that were discussed in the previous section. Nevertheless, just because host
governments issued an invitation and signed an agreement does not mean
that there is a genuine interest to implement interventions’ objectives.
Quite often, despite the invitation, host states resist in subtle and indirect
ways to take ownership of interventions’ objectives.
This is evident across CSDP interventions. In the EU, as one strategist
pointed out, “many narrow down local ownership to the invitation of the
partner country and their request for our support” and believe that ownership
exists because reforms that the EU supports are based on national policies
(Interview 12). The problem with this assumption is that locals often say
yes to whatever is proposed by the EU as an important donor (Interviews
25, 72, 74, 81, 91, 96, and 99). As one EU diplomat puts it:
General African response to a delegation coming by with an offer of a mission
would be “yes please come and we have a lots and lots things to do” and basi-
cally say yes to anything that is suggested in hope that whatever comes out will
be us useful one way or another. (Interview 25)
Once the mission is launched, however, the same authorities that had pre-
viously issued the invitation often do not pull their weight in the implemen-
tation of objectives which were not of their own making (Kappler &
Richmond, 2011; Rayroux &Wilén, 2014; Sahin, 2017; Vandemoortele, 2012).
The case of EUCAP Nestor provides a vivid illustration of both indirect
and direct forms of resistance to the attempts of the EU to responsibilize
the locals for externally devised mission objectives. According to the text of
the EU’s decision to launch EUCAP Nestor, for example, “The Governments
of Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles, and the Transitional Federal Govern-
ment of Somalia (FGS) have welcomed the deployment of the Mission in
their countries” (EU, 2012). However, the initial demand for the mission
came from the EU, concerned for its interests undermined by piracy (and
other threats such as migration and terrorism), and not from the host
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states in the Horn of Africa (Interviews 32, 33, 36, 73, and 109). As a result, the
mission had trouble acquiring even formal letters of invitation and SOMAs
from all countries (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p. 22). The interest was particu-
larly lukewarm in Kenya and Tanzania which did not see piracy as their
problem at all (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, pp. 19–22) and initially had unrea-
listic expectations that the mission will donate equipment like ships (Inter-
views 17, 32, and 42).
In Somalia, local authorities formally requested support from the EU and
reiterated their declarations of commitment. Nevertheless, as pointed out by
several mission members, this does not reflect real intentions as Somalis agree
to everything that the EU suggests (Interviews 71, 74, 81, 91, and 96). This
makes the EU, in the words of one mission member, “looking at the world
through a colored set of lenses because people often tell you things that
they think you want to hear” (Interview 96). One Somalilander agrees that
“the locals usually accept whatever they are offered… they want to please
the internationals and keep them here not only because of the money and
donations but because the government has very few international interlocu-
tors” (Interview 72).
As the objectives of the mission are not of their own making, locals often
exhibit various forms of indirect resistance to take ownership, especially
when requested reforms impinge on their individual or group interests
and/or interrupt established ways of doing things. This can be registered in
private conversations in which locals often depict the nature of the relationship
with the EU quite differently from the public transcript, according to which the
EU and local authorities work towardmutually agreed objectives. For example,
they often complain about the EU as an arrogant, self-interested, and over-
bureaucratized organization spending most of its money on its own travel
and security and on projects that are detached from local reality instead of sup-
porting the essential needs of their local counterparts (Interviews 72, 78, 84, and
94). In the words of a senior advisor in the local coast guard: “The EU humili-
ates us. They disrespect us. They underestimate the knowledge of Somali
experts…when they come here they think that we are small” (Interview 78).
Similarly, a Somali expert who works closely with the mission complains:
“These guys believe that they are bringing themoon, but they are not doing any-
thing. They are wasting a lot of money without any success because of some
stupid rules that don’t work here” (Interview 94).
This widely shared hidden transcript is the condition that makes more
practical forms of resistance possible. An illustrative example of an indirect
resistance is the case of coast guard bills. The mission helped both the FGS
and the Government of the Republic of Somaliland to draft their coast
guard bills. The bills were drafted based on “the European best practice”
and foresee Somali coast guards as relatively autonomous civilian bodies
within ministries of interior. In its public rhetoric, the EU representatives
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insist that they did not impose the bills and that the sovereign decision on how
to structure their coast guards lies with the Somali authorities (Interview 89).
In practice, however, the EU also made clear that the eventual decision to keep
the coast guard as a military institution might hamper future support of the
EU (Interview 17). One member of the coast guard recollects how EUCAP
Mission members were saying: “if you sign this, it will be the key for funding
… nothing before you sign the law and it’s passed. Then all the funding of the
EU will be open to you” (Interview 78). Despite the pressures, authorities in
Somalia and Somaliland have been dragging their feet with ratification of the
bills.
In February 2016, the indirect resistance transformed into a direct con-
testation, as the hidden transcript, depicted above, bursted into the official
correspondence, at least for a brief instance. On February 29, the Ministry
of Interior of Somaliland sent a harsh letter to EUCAP Nestor raising
serious concerns about its work. Although the letter starts with the reiteration
of the public transcript, that is, an expression of gratitude of the Government
of Somaliland to the EU for the assistance offered by EUCAP Nestor, it then
went on to make a long list of accusations, including for “imposing” agendas
and views on the Coast Guard, “underestimating” the local knowledge and
“lecturing… rather than being a partner who is here to help the SLCG
attain a certain degree of development” (Letter, 2016). As a result, the Head
of Office was removed from post while the project of the LIOC came to a halt.
My intention here is neither to rob the locals of any strategic agency nor to
romanticize their resistance in a narrative of “plucky locals standing up to
nasty internationals” (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 212). Although the analysis of
Somali interests and motivations goes beyond the scope of this article, it is
worth noting that resistance to alien governmentality is always a defense of
concrete interests and established ways of doing things. Thus, for example,
many interlocutors point out that the reasons behind the delay in ratification
of the coast guard bills are neither administrative backlog nor drought (as the
official storyline goes). Instead, the bills are intentionally not passed as they
could thwart plans of the Ministry of Defense to use the Coast Guard as a
nucleus of the future navy (Interview 17), but also create unwanted police
powers of the coast guard (Interview 95) and make it operationally auton-
omous from the Ministry of Interior (Interview 96). Mentoring of young offi-
cers in Somaliland, often in perceived violation of an established chain of
command, did not go down well with the local authorities, especially the
old guard who feared that the empowerment of the younger officers had
the potential to leave them jobless in a country without a proper pension
system (Interview 91).
Regardless of concrete motivations behind resistance, all these illustrations
point out to the conclusion that as long as ownership is based on the alien
rationality of interveners rather than the locals, it will be perceived as a
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constraint on local autonomy. As such it is likely to be contested and ulti-
mately resisted.
Conclusion
Local ownership is a post-cold war idiom of international peacebuilding uni-
versally endorsed by policy makers. Despite high rhetoric, local ownership
remains one of the weakest links in international interventions. In this
article, by using the evidence from EUCAP Nestor, I have argued that the
key reason why local ownership does not produce its intended outcomes lies
in its political rationality. In contrast to domestic liberalism which is based
on the rationality of the governed, local ownership as a principle of inter-
national interventions is based on the rationality of advanced democracies con-
cerned how to govern insecurities beyond their borders in developing and
conflict-affected states. Echoing the late colonial principle of indirect rule,
local ownership hence emerged as the most reasoned way of governing the
volatile peripheries of international society in the 2000s when the early post-
cold war enthusiasm about the prospects for liberal peace started to falter.
Being driven by this post-colonial rationality, ownership is operationalized
through techniques that aim to responsibilize but not necessarily to empower
the locals. Ultimately, this alien governmentality gives rise to various forms of
local resistance, both direct and indirect. Responsibilization across borders
may produce some of the intended consequences in advanced liberal states.
However, as we have clearly seen in the case of EUCAP Nestor, it has little
or no effect in environments with limited statehood and few (if any) liberal
institutions in place. Unfortunately, this is exactly the sort of environment
where international crisis management interventions usually take place.
That is why locals so frequently resist to assume ownership of international
interventions.
This is an important insight because it sheds a novel light on the colonial
origins of the local ownership principle, habitually deleted from the official
register, its post-colonial evolution and the contemporary context in which
it rose to a status of new orthodoxy in international interventions. Also, the
analysis shows how the political rationality of powerful intervening states is
translated through the technology of responsibilization into concrete tech-
niques of security governance, why it is perceived as a constraint on local
autonomy and likely to be resisted as such. My empirical focus on the little
studied EU intervention in the Horn of Africa is also an addition to the
more technical literature on CSDP.
Lastly, the article also brings to light a new set of empirical, normative, and
theoretical puzzles. Empirically, future studies could expand the analysis to
local ownership in other international interventions by the EU or other
actors. It would be particularly interesting to compare how different
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techniques of ownership as well as local resistance to them vary depending on
the context. It would also be especially apposite to learn why fragile and con-
flict-affected states internalized the principle and how and to what practical
effect they are using it to shape the course of international interventions. Nor-
matively, the question remains whether the principle of ownership is salvage-
able or should we rather abandon it altogether due to its inherently
problematic rationality. Theoretically, the article has not ventured into the
question why peacebuilders continue justifying local ownership on pragmatic
grounds despite the overwhelming record of implementation problems. Is
there something deeply “irrational” about the local ownership principle or,
imperfect as it is, it still fulfills some deeper, ontological needs of international
peace and state-builders? If yes, what are they?
Note
1. Interviewees were identified through a snowballing technique and included EU
policy architects in Brussels and its operational personnel on the ground, local
government, and security sector representatives, as well as relevant civil society
representatives. All interviews were semi-structured, anonymous, confidential,
and lasted on average between 60 and 90 min.
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